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Optimal Redistributive Taxation with Both Labor Supply 
and Labor Demand Responses
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This paper characterizes the optimal redistributive tax schedule in a matching unemployment 
framework with endogenous (voluntary) nonparticipation and (involuntary) unemployment. 
The optimal employment tax rate is given by an inverse employment elasticity rule. This rule 
depends on the global response of the employment rate, which depends not only on the 
participation (labor supply) responses, but also on the vacancy posting (labor demand) 
responses and on the product of these two types of responses. For plausible parameters, our 
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This paper analyzes the optimal income tax schedule with voluntary nonparticipation
and involuntary unemployment. Individuals decide whether they participate to the labor
force (the extensive margin). Because of matching frictions ￿ la Mortensen and Pissarides
(1999), a participating individual may be involuntary unemployed. The probability for a
participant to be recruited is endogenous and depends on the number of vacancies ￿rms
￿nd pro￿table to create (the labor demand margin). Individuals di⁄er both in their skills
and their costs of searching a job. The skill heterogeneity implies that employed workers
earn distinct wages. Costs of searching di⁄er across individuals of the same skill level,
which accounts for the extensive margin as in Diamond (1980), Saez (2002) or ChonØ and
Laroque (2005, 2011). The government observes only earnings, so it faces a second-best
redistribution problem. This paper derives the optimal employment tax, de￿ned as the
tax the worker pays plus the welfare bene￿t.1
Our model encompasses the standard case with only the extensive margin. A higher
level of the employment tax reduces the return of participation, thereby inducing some
individuals to stay out of the labor force. The optimal employment tax is inversely related
to the elasticity of the labor supply, as in the ￿extensive response model￿of Saez (2002).
We introduce labor demand through skill-speci￿c matching frictions ￿ la Mortensen
and Pissarides (1999). When a worker and a vacancy are randomly matched, a surplus is
created. The total surplus is the di⁄erence between the overall income the worker and the
employer get from the match and what they would get if their search was unsuccessful. We
make the simplifying assumption that the worker and the employer receive a ￿xed fraction
of this surplus. An increase in the employment tax reduces the total surplus, thereby both
the worker￿ s and the employer￿ s surplus. Therefore, a rise in the employment tax decreases
the net (or after-tax) wage and increases the gross (or pre-tax) wage. Employers thus ￿nd
less pro￿table to create vacancies, which decreases the number of taxpayers.2
We show that the optimal employment tax is then inversely related to the global elas-
ticity of employment. The latter is the sum of three terms: the labor supply elasticity,
the labor demand elasticity with respect to the ￿rm surplus and the product of these two
elasticities.3 The presence of this product is explained by the fact that any labor demand
1In the literature, the employment tax is traditionally called participation tax in the absence of (invol-
untary) unemployment.
2These e⁄ects are standard in the matching literature. See Mortensen and Pissarides (1999), Pissarides
(2000). Empirical evidence about the e⁄ects of gross wages on employment rates can be founded in e.g.
Kramarz and Phillipon (2001) or Beaudry et alii (2010).
3In an appendix available upon request, we show that in the full information case, the optimal employ-
ment tax is inversely related to the labor demand elasticity only. Intuitively, in such a case, the government
can condition taxation on the cost of searching to enforce individuals￿participation decisions without any
distortion of the labor supply. The labor supply elasticity does then not appear in the optimal tax formula.
1response to taxation, by a⁄ecting the job-￿nding probability, also a⁄ects the return to par-
ticipation. We also numerically investigate how introducing the labor demand responses
a⁄ects the optimal employment tax rates. Our matching environment induces much lower
employment tax rates than the usual competitive extensive response model.
An alternative way of introducing labor demand considerations in the optimal income
tax problem consists in assuming imperfect substitution between low and high-skilled labor
in a competitive setting. Stiglitz (1982) shows the desirability of a negative marginal tax
rate for high-skilled workers. This reduces the inequality in wage rates, thereby relaxing
the relevant incentive constraint. Allen (1987) and Guesnerie and Roberts (1984, 1987)
show that a minimum wage cannot relax the relevant incentive constraint. In these papers,
labor supply responses are concentrated along the intensive margin.
Lee and Saez (2008) consider instead a model with extensive responses. They derive
an optimal tax formula in the absence of a minimum wage. The labor demand elasticity
does not enter their formula. We interpret this di⁄erence with our optimal tax formula as
follows. In a competitive setting, wages are ￿ exible and clear the labor markets. Hence, in
the absence of participation responses, a change in the employment tax a⁄ects neither the
employment level nor the gross wage. In other words, employment responses to taxation
are driven only by the supply side of labor markets, the demand side inducing only changes
in prices. Conversely, in our model with unemployment and negotiated wages, a rise in the
employment tax increases the gross wage even in the absence of participation response. The
employment level is then a⁄ected by the response of the labor demand, which in￿ uences
the equity-e¢ ciency tradeo⁄.
Several papers study the optimal income tax model under search frictions on the la-
bor market. The optimal tax in Boone and Bovenberg (2002) and in Boadway, Cu⁄ and
Marceau (2003) acts as a Pigouvian tax to correct the ine¢ ciency that arises from the
search-congestion externalities. Hungerb￿hler, Lehmann, Parmentier and Van der Linden
(2006) and Lehmann, Parmentier and Van der Linden (2011) consider instead an envi-
ronment where these externalities are perfectly internalized by the wage setting process
in the no-tax economy. The role of taxation is therefore to redistribute income and not
to restore e¢ ciency. Hungerb￿hler and Lehmann (2009) consider both the redistributive
aspects and congestion externalities. In all of these papers except Boadway, Cu⁄ and
Marceau (2003), a rise in the marginal tax rate increases the share of the surplus that
the employer receives: a higher marginal tax rate discourages workers to claim for higher
wages, thereby reducing the gross wage negotiated and boosting the labor demand. In
However, the labor demand elasticity remains for two reasons. First, the government cannot in￿ uence the
matching process. Second, the government has no tax instrument on the number of vacancies created on
each labor market.
2contrast, we neglect this wage-cum-labor demand margin to stress the role of the labor
demand responses in the optimal tax formula.
This paper is organized as follows. Section II presents the model. Section III derives
the optimal tax formula and contrasts it with the case of a competitive labor market and
labor supply responses along the extensive margin. Section IV concludes.
II The general framework
Individuals are risk-neutral and endowed with distinct skill levels denoted by a. The
exogenous skill distribution is given by the continuous density function f(a), de￿ned on
the support [a0;a1], with 0 < a0 < a1 ￿ 1. The size of the population is normalized
to 1. Jobs are skill-speci￿c. A worker of skill a produces a units of output if and only
if she is employed in a type-a job,4 otherwise her production is nil. This assumption of
perfect segmentation is made for tractability and seems more realistic than the polar one
of a unique labor market for all skill levels.
At each skill level, some people choose to stay out of the labor force while some
others do participate to the labor market. We integrate this feature by assuming that
individuals of a given skill level di⁄er in their cost of searching a job ￿. The distribution
of ￿ conditional on skill level a is described by the conditional density H0 (:ja) over the
support R+. We assume that H (:ja) is twice continuously di⁄erentiable and strictly
positive for all ￿ 2 R+. The characteristics a and ￿ may be distributed independently or
may be correlated.
Among individuals who participate to the labor market, some fail to be recruited and
become unemployed. This involuntary unemployment is due to matching frictions. The
number of matches between employers and job seekers on the labor market of skill a is a
function of the stock of vacant posts, Va, and the stock of job seekers, Ua, in the market
(Mortensen and Pissarides 1999). Therefore, Ma(Va;Ua) denotes the matching function on
the labor market of skill a. If there were no frictions, the number of matches would be de-
termined by the short side of the market and the matching process would be e¢ cient. But
when job seekers and employers have to engage in a costly and time-consuming process of
search to ￿nd each other, the matching function captures the technology that brings them
together. The matching process is assumed not e¢ cient hence Ma(Va;Ua) < min(Va;Ua).
The matching function Ma(Va;Ua) is twice continuously di⁄erentiable on R2
+, increasing
and concave in both arguments, veri￿es Ma(0;Ua) = Ma(Va;0) = 0 since matches cannot
occur unless there are agents on both sides of the market and exhibits constant returns
4Allowing an agent to work in any occupation which requires a skill below her type opens the possibility
of monotonicity constraints and pooling that are studied in ChonØ and Laroque (2011).
3to scale. These assumptions are largely empirically supported as discussed by Petrongolo
and Pissarides (2001).
We assume that the government does neither observe individuals￿types (a;￿) nor the
job-search and matching processes. It only observes worker￿ s gross wage wa. Therefore,
the tax T (:) : R+ 7! R only depends on the gross wage w. Moreover, the government
is unable to distinguish among the non-employed individuals those who searched for a
job but failed to ￿nd one (the involuntary unemployed) from the non participants (the
voluntary unemployed). Therefore, the government is constrained to give the same level
of welfare bene￿t b 2 R+ to all non-employed agents.
The timing of the model is:
1. The government commits to a tax system de￿ned as a pair (T(:);b), with T (:) :
R+ 7! R which only depends on the gross wage w and the welfare bene￿t b 2 R+ for
the non-employed.
2. For each skill level a, ￿rms open vacancies. Creating a vacancy of type a costs
￿a > 0. Each type a-agent decides whether she participates to the labor market of
type a.
3. Matching occurs. Once matched, the ￿rm and the worker share the rent hence set
the wage.
4. Each worker of skill a produces a units of goods, receives a wage w = wa and pays
taxes or receive transfers. Taxes ￿nance the welfare bene￿t b and an exogenous
amount of public expenditures R ￿ 0. Agents consume.
II.1 Participation decision
An individual of type (a;￿) can decide to stay out of the labor force, in which case her
utility equals the welfare bene￿t b. Otherwise, she participates. Then, she ￿nds a job
with an endogenous probability ‘a and gets a utility level equals to wa￿T (wa)￿￿ or she
becomes unemployed with a probability 1 ￿ ‘a and gets a utility level equals to b ￿ ￿.
To participate, an agent of type (a;￿) should expect a higher expected utility ‘a(wa
￿T (wa)) + (1 ￿ ‘a)b ￿ ￿ than in case of non participation, b. Let ￿a = T(wa) + b denote
the employment tax. We de￿ne the expected surplus of a participant of type a as
￿a
def
￿ ‘a ￿ (wa ￿ T(wa) ￿ b) (1)
i.e. the additional income she gets if she ￿nds a job rather than being unemployed multi-
plied by the probability of employment. Any individual of skill a chooses to participate if
4her cost ￿ of searching a job is lower than the surplus ￿a she expects from ￿nding a job,
i.e. ￿ ￿ ￿a. Let ha denote the participation rate among individuals of skill a, i.e.:
ha = H (￿a ja) ￿ Pr[￿ ￿ ￿aja] (2)





￿a H0 (￿a ja)
H (￿a ja)
(3)
as the elasticity of the participation rate among individuals of skill a with respect to
the expected surplus of a participant ￿, at ￿ = ￿a. The empirical literature on the
participation decisions typically estimates the elasticity of participation with respect to
the di⁄erence between income in employment and in unemployment, wa ￿￿a. For a given
employment probability ‘a, ￿P
a equals this elasticity.
II.2 Labor demand
De￿ne market tightness ￿a as the ratio Va=Ua: The probability that a matching is suc-
cessful (i.e. the probability of ￿lling a type-a vacancy) equals ma(￿a) ￿ Ma(Va;Ua)=Va =
Ma(1;1=￿a). Due to search-matching externalities, the matching probability decreases
with the number of vacancies (Va) and increase with the number of job-seekers (Ua).
Since Ma(Va;Ua) exhibits constant returns to scale, only tightness matters and ma(￿a) is
a decreasing function of ￿a. Symmetrically, the probability that a job-seeker ￿nds a job
is an increasing function of tightness ￿ama(￿a) ￿ Ma(Va;Ua)=Ua = Ma(￿a;1) with the
functions ma(￿a) and ￿ama(￿a) de￿ned from R+ to (0;1). Firms and individuals being
atomistic, they take tightness ￿a as given.
When a ￿rm creates a vacancy of type a, it ￿lls it with probability ma(￿a). The
creation of this vacancy costs ￿a > 0 to the ￿rm. This cost includes the screening of
applicants and investment in equipment for the extra worker. The ￿rm￿ s expected pro￿t
is m(￿a)(a ￿ wa)￿￿a. For a given number of job-seekers, a rise in the number of vacancies
decreases this expected pro￿t because each vacancy is ￿lled with a lower probability. Firms
create vacancies until the free-entry condition ma(￿a)(a ￿ wa) = ￿a is met. This pins down
the value of tightness ￿a as m￿1
a (￿a=(a ￿ wa)).5 In turn, it also gives the probability of
￿nding a job (or the labor demand) through ￿ama (￿a) = La (a ￿ wa), where the labor
demand function La (:) is de￿ned as:












At the equilibrium, one has ‘a = La (a ￿ wa).
5where m
￿1
a (:) denotes the reciprocal of function ￿ 7! ma (￿), holding a constant.
5The La(:) function is a reduced form that captures everything we need on the labor
demand side. From the assumptions made on the matching function, La(:) is twice-
continuously di⁄erentiable and admits values within (0;1). As the wage wa increases, ￿rms
get lower surplus (a￿wa) on each ￿lled vacancy, fewer vacancies are created and tightness
￿a decreases. This explains why the employment probability ‘a decreases with the wage
wa. Moreover, due to the constant-returns-to-scale assumption, the probability of being
employed depends only on skill and wage levels and not on the number of participants. If
for a given wage, there are twice more participants, the free-entry condition leads to twice
more vacancies, so the level of employment is twice higher and the employment probability
is una⁄ected. This property is in accordance with the empirical evidence that the size of
the labor force has no lasting e⁄ect on group-speci￿c unemployment rates. Finally, because
labor markets are perfectly segmented by skill, the probability that a participant of type
a ￿nds a job depends only on the wage level wa and not on wages in other segments of
the labor market.
We then de￿ne the elasticity of the (type-a) labor demand to the surplus of the ￿rm




￿ (a ￿ wa)
L0
a (a ￿ wa)
La (a ￿ wa)
=
1 ￿ ￿a (￿a)
￿a (￿a)
> 0 (5)
where (4) has been used and ￿a (￿a) denotes the elasticity of the matching function with
respect to the mass of job-seekers Ua evaluated at ￿a = m￿1
a (￿a=(a ￿ wa)) . The empirical
literature on labor demand is typically concerned with the elasticity of employment with
respect to the level of wage. Controlling for participation decisions in our model, the latter
elasticity is negative and equals ￿￿D
a ￿ (wa=(a ￿ wa)).
II.3 The wage setting
Once a ￿rm and a worker are matched, they share the rent, i.e. the sum of the ￿rm￿ s
surplus a￿wa and of the worker￿ s surplus wa￿T (wa)￿b. In the absence of an agreement,
nothing is produced and the worker gets the welfare bene￿t b. The bargaining process
determines how the total surplus Sa = a ￿ T (wa) ￿ b is shared between the worker and
the ￿rm. The result of the bargaining can be viewed as the outcome of the maximization
of an objective ￿(x;y) that is increasing in the ￿rm￿ s x = a ￿ wa and the employee￿ s
y = wa￿T (wa)￿b surplus. For instance, the generalized Nash bargaining framework takes
the form ￿(x;y) = x1￿￿y￿. However, di⁄erent expressions for ￿(:;:) can be considered








an e⁄ect of marginal tax rates on wages.6 This simpli￿cation enables us to clearly identify
6L￿ Haridon, Malherbet and Perez-Duarte (2010) compare the properties of the Mortensen and Pissarides
(1999) framework under three di⁄erent solutions to the bargaining problem: The egalitarian, the Nash









w ￿ T (w) ￿ b
￿
￿
When the income tax function T (:) is di⁄erentiable with T0 (:) ￿ 1 everywhere, the solution
to this program is unique and given by:
wa = ￿ ￿ a + (1 ￿ ￿) ￿ (T (wa) + b)
In this case, it is equivalent for the government to design an income tax function T (:), or
to directly design the employment tax ￿a = T (wa) + b for each skill level.7 Then
wa = ￿ ￿ a + (1 ￿ ￿)￿a (6)
The gross wage wa is increasing with the employment tax ￿a. An increase of the em-
ployment tax will reduce the employee￿ s surplus hence the employee will o⁄set her loss by
a larger bargained wage wa. Since a ￿ wa = (1 ￿ ￿)(a ￿ ￿a) from (6), the employment
probability veri￿es:
‘a = La [(1 ￿ ￿)(a ￿ ￿a)] (7)
Combining (1) and (6), the expected surplus from participating equals:
￿a = ￿ ￿ (a ￿ ￿a) ￿ La [(1 ￿ ￿)(a ￿ ￿a)] (8)
and the skill-speci￿c participation rate equals:
ha = H [￿ ￿ (a ￿ ￿a) ￿ La [(1 ￿ ￿)(a ￿ ￿a)]ja] (9)
Finally, the skill speci￿c employment rate ea equals the product of the participation rate
ha by the probability ‘a for each participant to ￿nd a job:
ea = ‘a ￿ ha = La [(1 ￿ ￿)(a ￿ ￿a)] ￿ H [￿ (a ￿ ￿a) La [(1 ￿ ￿)(a ￿ ￿a)]ja] (10)
Bargaining and the Kalai-Smorodinsky solutions. When the worker and the ￿rm have equal bargaining
power (i.e. ￿ = 0:5), our wage setting coincides with the ￿Egalitarian Solution￿(see the derivation of their
Equation (22)). The Nash solution conversely depends on the marginal tax rate. The Kalai-Smorodinsky
solution depends on the level of tax T (a) in the utopian case where the worker extracts all the surplus.
7The government can decentralize an allocation characterized with a di⁄erentiable a 7! ￿a mapping by








A given a 7! ￿a leads to a wage level given by (6). This wage is increasing in a only when ￿￿=(1 ￿ ￿) <
@￿a=@a. Then, Equation (6) can be inverted to express the skill as a di⁄erentiable function a = A(w) of the
wage, with A










￿ + (1 ￿ ￿)
@￿a
@a
This tax function veri￿es T
0 (w) ￿ 1 only if @￿a=@a < 1. In this case, the second-best problem is equivalent
to a case where the government observes the skill a, but not the cost of participation ￿.













where we used elasticities de￿ned in (3) and (5). We henceforth refer to the term in brack-
ets in (11) as the global elasticity of employment. The product ￿D
a ￿P
a enters this formula
because any increase in the labor demand gives additional incentives for individuals to
enter the labor force, so it reinforces the labor supply. This complementarity between
labor demand and labor supply is a key insight of the unemployment matching theory.
II.4 The government
We assume that the government cares about the distribution of expected utilities, namely,
‘a ￿ (wa ￿ T (wa)) + (1 ￿ ‘a) ￿ b ￿ ￿ = ￿a + b ￿ ￿ (from (8)) for those who participate
and b for nonparticipating individuals. More precisely, the government has the following





￿(￿a + b ￿ ￿) ￿ dH (￿ja) + ￿(b) ￿ (1 ￿ H (￿a ja))
￿
￿ f (a) ￿ da (12)
where ￿0 (:) > 0, ￿00 (:) ￿ 0. The stronger the concavity of ￿(:) the more averse to in-
equality is the government. Assuming ￿00 (:) = 0 corresponds to the Benthamite Utilitarian
criterion that sums the individual expected utilities.
The government faces the following budget constraint
Z a1
a0
￿a ￿ ea ￿ f(a) ￿ da ￿ b ￿ R = 0 (13)
that is written so that the welfare bene￿t b is provided to all agents in the economy but for
each additional worker of skill a, the government saves the welfare bene￿t b and collects
taxes T(wa) (the sum of these being ￿a). Taking (2) and (7) into account, this budget
constraint can be rewritten as
Z a1
a0
￿a ￿ La [(1 ￿ ￿)(a ￿ ￿a)] ￿ H (￿ ￿ (a ￿ ￿a) ￿ La [(1 ￿ ￿)(a ￿ ￿a)]ja) ￿ f(a) ￿ da
= b + R (14)
III The optimal tax policy
The optimal tax problem consists in ￿nding the optimal level of bene￿t b and of employ-
ment tax at each skill level ￿a to maximize the social objective (12) subject to the budget
constraint (14), taking (7) into account. This problem is solved in Appendix B.
8Let ￿ be the Lagrange multiplier of the budget constraint. We interpret ￿ as the
marginal social cost of the public funds R and we let ga denote the marginal social welfare





0 ￿0 (￿a + b ￿ ￿) ￿ H0 (￿ja) ￿ d￿
￿ ￿ ha
(15)
Intuitively, the government is indi⁄erent between giving one more euro to each of the agent






as the marginal social welfare weight of non-participating individuals expressed in terms
of public funds. The optimal tax policy is given in the following proposition, which is
proved in the appendix and in the heuristic proof below.




ga ￿ ha + gN
a ￿ (1 ￿ ha)
￿






















1 ￿ ga ￿ ￿ ￿ (1 + ￿D






Equation (17a) states that the marginal cost of public funds is a weighted average of
the social marginal utilities of the workers (ga) and of the unemployed (gN
a ). Equation
(17b) leads to (18).
Our general model encompasses two speci￿c cases. First, one can retrieve the pure
extensive margin model when the matching function veri￿es Ma(V;U) = U and ￿ = 1.
When Ma(V;U) = U, any job-seeker becomes employed, as in Diamond (1980), Saez
(2002) and ChonØ and Laroque (2005, 2011). If in addition the workers have all the
bargaining power (i.e. ￿ = 1), equation (6) leads to the equality between the skill level
a and the gross wage wa. Under these two assumptions, to which we henceforth refer to
as the ￿pure extensive response￿model, Equation (17b) becomes identical to the inverse








Second, our model also encompasses the polar ￿pure labor demand response￿model
with ￿xed participation decisions ￿P = 0. Equations (17a)-(17b) then become:
Z a1
a0













To derive and interpret Equations (17b), (19) and (20b), we consider a perturbation of
the optimal tax function that consists in a small increase8 dT (wa) > 0 in the tax liability
at wage wa. For a constant level of bene￿t b, this increase induces a rise d￿a = dT (wa) in
the employment tax ￿a paid by workers of skill level, which implies a ￿mechanical￿ e⁄ect,
an ￿employment response￿e⁄ect and a ￿social welfare￿e⁄ect that we now describe.
Mechanical e⁄ect
Absent any behavioral change, the government levies d￿a additional taxes on each job
of skill a. Their mass is ea ￿ f (a). From (13), the mechanical increase in tax revenue
equals:
Ma = ea ￿ f (a) ￿ d￿a (21)
This e⁄ect is identical in our general model, in the pure extensive case and in the pure
labor demand case.
Employment response e⁄ect
The increase in the employment tax d￿a > 0 induces a reduction in the employment














This reduction is made of a direct change in participation, a direct labor demand response
and the e⁄ect of the labor demand response on the incentives to participate. In particular,
the term ￿D
a ￿P
a captures the complementarity between labor demand and participation
responses. The bargaining power ￿ appears because we want to express the optimal level
of the employment tax as a fraction of the gross wage level wa. This parameter would
have been absent if instead we had written the employment tax as a fraction of the skill
level a. As each additional worker of skill a increases the government￿ s revenue by the
employment tax ￿a, the employment e⁄ect equals











￿ ea ￿ f (a) ￿ d￿a (22)





a matters instead of the sole labor supply elasticity ￿P
a .
Second, the employment response e⁄ect is multiplied by the fraction ￿ of the surplus that
accrues to the worker. In the pure extensive case, one has ￿ = 1 and wa = a.9
8The case where the employment tax is decreased is symmetric as only ￿rst-order e⁄ects are considered.
9The above distinction between expressing the employment tax as a fraction of the wage or as a fraction
of the skill becomes meaningless.





a is reduced to the sole labor demand elasticity ￿D
a .
Social welfare e⁄ect
We now describe how the reform a⁄ects the social welfare function (12). Given our
assumption that the government cares about the distribution of expected utilities, one
should determine how the reform modi￿es the expected surplus ￿a de￿ned in (1). On the
one hand, there is a direct e⁄ect on the surplus wa ￿ ￿a extracted by the worker. From
(6), this change amounts to
d(wa ￿ ￿a) = ￿￿ ￿ d￿a
On the other hand, the labor demand response implies a reduction in the job-￿nding





￿ ‘a ￿ d￿a
Combining these two e⁄ects, the expected surplus is reduced by





￿ ‘a ￿ d￿a
This reduction induces some individuals to stop participating. However, these pivotal
individuals are indi⁄erent between participating or not, so the change in their participation
decisions has no ￿rst-order e⁄ect on the social objective. Recall that ga is the marginal
social welfare weight given to workers of skill a, expressed in terms of public funds (see
(15)). The social welfare e⁄ect equals:





￿ ea ￿ f (a) ￿ d￿a (23)
In the pure extensive response model where ￿ = 1 and ￿D

















From (5), this restriction leads to the equality between the worker￿ s share ￿ of the total
surplus and the elasticity ￿a of the matching function with respect to unemployment. This
equality is known in the matching literature as the Hosios (1990) condition. It ensures
that the total surplus generated by a match is shared in such a way that the congestion
externalities are internalized by the wage setting. There is no particular reason why the
Hosios condition should be satis￿ed, since it ￿relates a parameter of the resolution of
bargaining con￿ ict to a parameter of the technology of matching￿(Pissarides (2000, page
198)).
11In our model, when the Hosios condition (24) is not met, the tax instrument cannot
be used to correct for congestion externalities, as it cannot modify the fraction of the
surplus that each party receives through the wage bargain. Still, a deviation from the
Hosios condition a⁄ects the optimal tax for tax incidence reasons. Workers only pay a
fraction ￿ of a tax increase from (6). Moreover a rise in taxation also a⁄ects the job-￿nding






the incidence of a tax increase on the welfare of a participant of skill a.
A small change in the employment tax must imply no ￿rst-order e⁄ect. Adding (21),
(22) and (23) and rearranging terms gives (17b). Rearranging terms again lead to the
optimal employment tax rates given in (18).
III.2 Sign of the optimal employment tax
The sign of the employment tax rate is given by the di⁄erence between the mechanical (21)
and the social welfare e⁄ects (23). The employment tax is therefore positive for workers







and negative for the others.
In the pure labor demand case, the weighted average of social welfare weights
R a1
a0 ga ￿
f (a) ￿ da equals 1 (see (20a)). Under a concave social welfare function ￿(:), the social
welfare weights ga are decreasing in the skill levels a under the plausible assumption that
the expected surplus ￿a is increasing in the skill level. Therefore, if one also assumes
that the Hosios condition (24) holds, the employment tax on the least skilled workers is
negative, a case that Saez (2002) de￿nes as an Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC).
In the pure extensive case and in the general model, the welfare of nonparticipants
has to be taken into account. From (15) and (16), one has gN > ga whenever the social
welfare function ￿(:) is concave. In particular, when the social welfare function is close to
a Maximin objective, one typically obtains gN > 1 > ga. Assuming again that the Hosios
condition holds, an EITC is then ruled out.
III.3 Quantitative insights
In this section, we numerically investigate how introducing the labor demand responses
a⁄ects the optimal employment tax rates ￿a=wa. For this purpose, we use (18) to compute
optimal employment tax rates for di⁄erent calibrated values of ￿P
a , ￿D
a , ￿ and ga.
We take three values for ￿P
a , namely 0, 0:25, and 0:5. These values are plausible lower
bound, average and higher bound estimates for ￿P
a , according to Immervoll et alii (2007)
and Meghir and Phillips (2008), among others. To calibrate the elasticity ￿D
a of the job-
￿nding probability with respect to the ￿rm surplus a ￿ wa, we use (5) and the estimates
of the matching function surveyed by Petrongolo and Pissarides (2001). We take ￿ = 0:5,
12thereby ￿D
a = 1 as a benchmark. However, we also consider the pure extensivce case where
the labor demand is unresponsive (￿D








1 2=3 0:5 1 2=3 0:5
0 100% 75:0% 66:7% 100% 60:0% 50:0%
0:25 80:0% 63:2% 57:1% 66:7% 46:2% 40:0%
0:5 66:7% 54:5% 50:0% 50:0% 37:5% 33:3%
Table 1: Optimal employment taxes ￿a=wa under the Hosios condition
We consider in Table 1 cases where the bargaining power is adjusted to ful￿ll the
Hosios condition (24). The ￿rst and fourth columns give ￿a=wa in the pure extensive
response model (where ￿D
a = 0) while the ￿rst row provides values of ￿a=wa in the pure
labor demand model (where ￿P
a = 0). Increasing the labor demand elasticity implies two





a increases, which tends to reduce the magnitude of the employment tax
rates. Second, the reduction in ￿ that takes place to keep the Hosios condition does not
change the ratio of the optimal employment tax ￿a to the skill level a. However, it reduces
the ratio of the wage wa to the skill a, hence it tends to increase the employment tax
rate ￿a=wa. The overall e⁄ect is negative under the Hosios condition.10 This e⁄ect is
quanti￿ed in Table 1. A larger labor demand elasticity substantially reduces the optimal
employment tax. For instance, when ￿P
a = 0:25, ￿a=wa shrinks by 23 percentage points
(from 80% to 57%) under Maximin and by 33 percentage points (from 67% to 40%) with
a marginal social welfare weight ga equals to 0:5.
The empirical literature on labor taxation typically distinguishes an intensive margin
and an extensive margin of the labor supply. In estimating the latter, the controls for
changes in job-￿nding probabilities are typically lacking. Hence, it is unclear whether the
responses of employment to taxation identify the sole participation elasticity ￿P
a , or the




a . Consequently, in each row of Table 2,
the global elasticity of employment remains constant (at respectively 0:5, 0:7 and 1). As
the labor demand elasticity increases, the participation elasticity shrinks. Some cells in





1 ￿ ga + ￿ ￿ [(1 + ￿D
a )(1 + ￿P
a ) ￿ 1]
=
1 ￿ ga





where we use again the Hosios condition (24) to get the second equality. Hence, optimal employment tax
rates in absolute value decreases with the labor demand elasticity.
13ga 0 0:5
￿D







1 2=3 0:5 1 2=3 0:5
0:5 66:7% 75:0% ￿ 50:0% 60:0% ￿
0:75 57:1% 66:7% ￿ 40:0% 50:0% ￿
1 50:0% 60:0% 66:7% 33:3% 42:9% 50:0%
Table 2: Optimal employment taxes ￿a=wa under the Hosios condition
Table 2 are empty since ￿P
a cannot be negative. Moreover, the bargaining power ￿ is again
adjusted to ful￿ll the Hosios condition (24). Increasing ￿D
a requires to reduce ￿ to keep
the Hosios condition satis￿ed. Therefore, from (18) with ga < 1, the optimal employment
tax rate increase with ￿D
a , the global elasticity being constant. Increasing ￿D
a from 0 to
0:5 increases the employment tax ￿a by about 8 or 10 percentage points when ga = 0.
Employment tax rates are lower when ga = 0:5 and decrease in ￿D
a by a similar extent.
Hence, for a given global elasticity of employment, optimal employment tax rates are
substantially higher when labor demand responses contribute more (thereby participation







0:3 0:5 0:7 0:3 0:5 0:7
0 76:9% 66:7% 58:8% 70:0% 50:0% 30:0%
0:25 69:0% 57:1% 48:8% 60:9% 40:0% 22:2%
0:5 62:5% 50:0% 41:7% 53:8% 33:3% 17:6%
Table 3: Otimal employment tax rates ￿a=wa when the Hosios condition is violated
Finally, Table 3 studies the impact of deviating from the Hosios condition (24). In each
row, we vary the worker￿ s share ￿ of the total surplus, while we keep ￿D
a at its benchmark
value of 1. We take one value of ￿ below (0:3), one value at (0:5) and one value above
the Hosios condition (24). According to (17b), a rise in ￿ has two e⁄ects on the optimal
employment tax rate ￿a=wa. First, the employment tax rate is the product of the ratio of
the employment tax to the skill level ￿a=a times the ratio of the skill level to the gross wage
a=wa. When ga = 0, the ￿rst term is una⁄ected by a rise in ￿, while the second shrinks.
Hence the optimal employment tax rate decreases when ga = 0. Second, a given increase of
the employment tax ￿a has a larger impact on the welfare of the workers when ￿ is higher.
Therefore, the optimal employment tax decreases with ￿. Table 3 highlights that the
quantitative impact of ￿ is substantial. For instance, when ga = 0, increasing the worker￿ s
14share ￿ from 0:3 to 0:7 reduces the optimal employment tax rate by approximately one
third. When ￿P
a = 0:25 and ga = 0:5, increasing ￿ from 0:3 to 0:7 divides the employment
tax rate by nearly 3.
IV Conclusion
The optimal tax schedule derived in the optimal tax model with labor supply along the
extensive margin is drastically modi￿ed when labor demand is taken into account in a
search-matching economy. The employment tax is still an inverse elasticity rule however
the elasticity term encapsulates not only labor supply responses (as in the standard model)
but also labor demand responses and the crossed e⁄ects between labor demand and labor
supply, the two latter being neglected in the standard framework. For plausible values
of the parameters, matching frictions induce much lower employment tax rates than the
ones found in the usual competitive model.
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Appendices
A Link between the elasticity of the labor demand and the
elasticity of the matching function
Let ￿a (:) denote the elasticity of the matching function Ma (:;:) with respect to the mass
of job-seekers Ua. Because the matching function is increasing in both arguments and
16exhibits constant returns to scale, ￿a depends only on the level of tightness and one must
have ￿a (￿) 2 (0;1) for all ￿. From the de￿nition ma (￿) = Ma (1;1=￿), the elasticity
of the probability of ￿lling a vacancy to the tightness level (i.e. (￿a=ma)(@ma (￿)=@￿a))
equals ￿￿a (￿). Hence the elasticity of the reciprocal m￿1


















which leads to the second equality in (5). The inequality holds because ￿a (￿) 2 (0;1).
B Proof of Proposition 1
The Lagrangian of the optimal tax problem is
Z a1
a0







￿(￿ ￿ (a ￿ ￿a) ￿ La [(1 ￿ ￿)(a ￿ ￿a)] + b ￿ ￿) ￿ dH (￿ja)
+￿(b) ￿ (1 ￿ H (￿ ￿ (a ￿ ￿a) ￿ La [(1 ￿ ￿)(a ￿ ￿a)]ja))
+￿ ￿ ￿a ￿ La [(1 ￿ ￿)(a ￿ ￿a)] ￿ H (￿ ￿ (a ￿ ￿a) ￿ La [(1 ￿ ￿)(a ￿ ￿a)]ja)





￿0 (￿a + b ￿ ￿) ￿ dH (￿ja) + ￿0 (b) ￿ (1 ￿ ha)
)
f (a)da = ￿
Using (15) and (16) gives (17a). The ￿rst-order condition with respect to ￿a writes 0 =
@L
@￿a (￿a;b;￿). Using (3) and (5), this leads to:


























￿ ‘a ￿ ha
Dividing both sides by ￿ha‘a = ￿ea, using (15) and wa ￿ ￿a = ￿ (a ￿ ￿a) (from (6)) gives
(17b).
17